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Abstract  
The papers in this special issue focus on the emerging phenomenon of cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies 
are digital financial assets, for which ownership and transfers of ownership are guaranteed by a cryptographic 
decentralized technology. The rise of cryptocurrencies' value on the market and the growing popularity 
around the world open a number of challenges and concerns for business and industrial economics. Using 
the lenses of both neoclassical and behavioral theories, this introductory article discusses the main trends in 
the academic research related to cryptocurrencies and highlights the contributions of the selected works to 
the literature. A particular emphasis is on socio-economic, misconduct and sustainability issues. We posit 
that cryptocurrencies may perform some useful functions and add economic value, but there are reasons to 
favor the regulation of the market. While this would go against the original libertarian rationale behind 
cryptocurrencies, it appears a necessary step to improve social welfare.  
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1 Introduction  
Cryptocurrencies continue to draw a lot of attention from investors, entrepreneurs, regulators and the 
general public. Much recent public discussions of cryptocurrencies have been triggered by the substantial 
changes in their prices, claims that the market for cryptocurrencies is a bubble without any fundamental 
value, and also concerns about evasion of regulatory and legal oversight. These concerns have led to calls for 
increased regulation or even a total ban. Further debates concern inter alia: the classification of 
cryptocurrencies as commodities, money or something else; the potential development of cryptocurrency 
derivatives and of credit contracts in cryptocurrency; the use of initial coin offerings (ICO) employing 
cryptocurrency technology to finance start-up initiatives; and the issue of digital currencies by central banks 
employing cryptocurrency technologies.  
These discussions often shed more heat than light. There is as yet little clearly established scientific 
knowledge about the markets for cryptocurrencies and their impact on economies, businesses and people. 
This special issue of the Journal of Industrial and Business Economics aims at contributing to fill this gap. The 
collection of papers in the special issue offers six distinct perspectives on cryptocurrencies, written from both 
traditional and behavioural viewpoints and addressing both financial questions and broader issues of the 
relationship of cryptocurrencies to socio-economic development and sustainability.  
Here in this introduction we set the stage by defining and discussing the main concepts and issues addressed 
in the papers collected in this special issue and previewing their individual contributions. Cryptocurrencies 
are digital financial assets, for which records and transfers of ownership are guaranteed by a cryptographic 
technology rather than a bank or other trusted third party. They can be viewed as financial assets because 
they bear some value (discussed below) for cryptocurrency holders, even though they represent no matching 
liability of any other party and are not backed by any physical asset of value (such as gold, for example, or 
the equipment stock of an enterprise).1  
As the word cryptocurrency, and the other terminology employing ‘coin’, ‘wallets’ in the original whitepaper 
proposing the supporting technology for Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008) all suggest, the original developers 
consciously attempted to develop a digital transfer mechanism that corresponded to direct transfer of 
physical cash used for payments or other financial assets – such as a precious metals and ‘bearer bonds’ – 
that like cash also change hands through physical transfer.  
What about the arrangements used for financial assets recorded in digital form (such as bank deposits, 
equities or bonds but not bearer bonds or bank notes)? Ownership arrangements for these assets depend 
on the information system maintained by a financial institution (commercial bank, custodian bank, fund 
manager) determining who is entitled to any income or other rights it offers and has the right of sale or 
transfer. Originally these systems were paper based, but since the 1960s they have utilised first mainframe 
and more recently personal computer systems.2 If there is a shortcoming in their information system, for 
example a breach of security that leads to theft or loss or failure to carry out an instruction for transfer, then 
the financial institution is legally responsible for compensating the owner of the asset.  
                                                          
1 From the accounting perspective, cryptocurrencies are investment assets, sometimes even treated similarly to stocks 
for accounting purposes (Raiborn and Sivitanides, 2015). 
2 Milne (2015) provides a history of the information systems used in securities markets.  
In the case of cryptocurrencies, it is the supporting software that both verifies ownership and executes 
transfers.3 There is no requirement for a ‘trusted third party’.4 This approach though requires a complete 
historical record of previous cryptocurrency transfers, tracing back each holding of cryptocurrency to its 
initial creation. This historical record is based on a “blockchain”, a linking of records (“blocks”) to each other 
in such a way that each new block contains information about the previous blocks in the growing list (“chain”) 
of digital records. So that every participant in the cryptocurrency network sees the same transaction history, 
a new block is accepted by agreement across the entire network.  
The applications of this technology are not necessarily finance-related; they can be applied to any form of 
record-keeping; however if the block refers to a financial transaction then each transaction in the blockchain, 
by definition, includes information about previous transactions, and thus verifies the ownership of the 
financial asset being transferred. Falsifying ownership, i.e. counterfeiting (which, one could imagine, is easy, 
as digital objects can be easily duplicated by copying), is impossible because one would have to alter 
preceding records in the whole chain. Since records are kept in the network of many users’ computers, a 
“distributed ledger”, this is rather unthinkable. 
There is a substantial computer science literature on the supporting cryptocurrency technologies, including 
on the security of public key cryptography, efficient search tools for finding transactions on the blockchain, 
and the ‘consensus’ mechanisms used to establish agreement on ledger contents across the network.5   
Commentators expect new more efficient approaches will replace the mechanisms currently used in Bitcoin 
and other cryptocurrencies.6 This though would not affect our definition of cryptocurrencies (as an asset and 
some technology which verifies ownership of the asset), which is independent of any particular technological 
implementation.7 
Cryptocurrencies can be seen as part of a broader class of financial assets, “cryptoassets” with similar peer-
to-peer digital transfers of value, without involving third party institutions for transaction certification 
purposes. What distinguishes cryptocurrencies from other cryptoassets? This depends on their purpose, i.e. 
whether they are issued only for transfer or whether they also fulfil other functions. Within the overall 
category of cryptoassets, we can follow the distinctions drawn in recent regulatory reports, distinguishing 
two further sub-categories categories of cryptoassets, on top of cryptocurrencies:8 
                                                          
3 A more detailed yet still accessible overview of the key features of the current technology behind cryptocurrencies can 
be found in Böhme et al. (2015). Narayanan et. al. (2016) provide a detailed textbook description. A key feature is that 
ownership is identified with a public cryptographic key. The matching private cryptographic key can then be used both 
to confirm ownership of the associated public key and to instruct transfers of the cryptocurrency to other public keys. 
The number of these keys is effectively unlimited. In the case of Bitcoin these keys are 256-bit binary numbers, so in 
consequence there are 2256 possible public keys; an almost unimaginably large number. 
4 Third parties may still play a role in the functioning of a cryptocurrency. For example, 5% of XRP, the cryptocurrency 
that supports Ripple international payments platform is held by Ripple themselves, and their decisions to buy or sell 
affect market supply. Third parties also support stablecoins such as Tether or Facebook’s proposed Libra currency. 
5 Blockchains are validated and updated within peer-to-peer networks using a ‘consensus mechanism’ (for example 
“proof of work” or “proof of stake”, see Tschorsch and Scheuermann, 2016) that prevents members of the network 
from creating a false version of history. This consensus then supports a fully decentralized secure verification of 
ownership and exchange (Pilkington, 2016; Goldstein et al., 2019). In the case of Bitcoin, the term block was originally 
used because its consensus mechanism (‘mining’) is applied to append ‘blocks’ of around 1,000 transactions at a time 
to the chain of transaction records. 
6 For a review of several prominent consensus mechanisms see Baliga (2017). 
7 Ripple (XRP) is an example of a cryptoasset that does not use blockchain. However, it has a different purpose designed 
primarily to mediate conversions from currency to currency, or from any asset A to asset B. 
8 For example (Bank of England, Financial Conduct Authority, and HM Treasury 2018; ESMA 2019; EBA 2019) and also 
(Hacker and Thomale 2017). The term ‘token’ is often used as a shorthand reference to cryptoassets, especially for 
crypto securities and crypto utility assets (e.g. Adhami, S. & Guegan, D. (2020)), though Milne (2018) argues that this 
usage can be misleading, disguising similarities with more conventional financial assets.  
1. Cryptocurrencies: an asset on a blockchain that can be exchanged or transferred between network 
participants and hence used as a means of payment – but offers no other benefits.  
Within cryptocurrencies it is then possible to distinguish those whose quantity is fixed and price market 
determined (floating cryptocurrencies) and those where a supporting arrangement, software or 
institutional, alters the supply in order to maintain a fixed price against other assets (stable coins, for 
example Tether or the planned Facebook Libra).   
2. Crypto securities: an asset on a blockchain that, in addition, offers the prospect of future payments, 
for example a share of profits. 
3. Crypto utility assets: an asset on a blockchain that, in addition, can be redeemed for or give access 
to some pre-specified products or services. 
 
A further distinguishing feature of crypto securities and crypto utility assets is that they are issued through a 
public sale (in so called initial coin offerings or ICOs). ICOs have been a substantial source of funding for 
technology orientated start-up companies using blockchain based business models. These classifications of 
crypto assets are critical for global regulators, since they need to determine whether a particular cryptoasset 
should be regulated as an e-money, as a security or as some other form of financial instrument, especially in 
relation to potential concerns about investor protection in ICOs.9  
Floating cryptocurrencies account for the very large majority of the cryptoasset market capitalisation (Tether, 
a stablecoin, and Bitfinex’s UNUS SED LEO, a utility coin, are in the top 12 cryptoassets by market 
capitalisation, all the rest are floating cryptocurrencies). Table 1 summarises the market share of leading 
cryptocurrencies at the time of writing. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
What underlies the value of cryptocurrencies? On the one hand, cryptocurrencies should be able to ease 
financial transactions through elimination of the intermediaries, reduction of transaction costs, accessibility 
to everyone connected to the Internet, greater privacy and security (see, e.g., discussions in Böhme et al. 
2015; Richter et al., 2015).10 On the other hand, the real economic value transferred in the transactions of 
freely floating cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin’s BTC and Ethereum’s Ether remains unclear. Despite the 
exhaustive and unfalsifiable record of all previous transactions held cryptographically, as in the Bitcoin 
blockchain, the information only refers to nominal numbers, i.e. the amount of cryptocurrency units 
transferred. One can, however, get an idea of the market value of cryptocurrencies by looking at their 
exchange rates against existing fiat currencies. This is possible thanks to cryptocurrency exchanges, which 
provide a nearly continuous price record for all actively traded cryptocurrencies. Although the resulting 
exchange rates are highly volatile, they reveal that cryptocurrencies have a non-zero value for those prepared 
to pay fiat currency in order to purchase them. 
What drives this value in the absence of a backing asset or an issuer’s liability? Some advocate it is the cost 
of “mining” (energy and time spent on computational efforts required to complete formation of a new block 
in the chain, and rewarded by a newly issued cryptocurrency unit), however the cost borne by one member 
                                                          
9 Recent discussion of these issues includes FSB (2018), FCA (2019) and Blandin et. al. (2019). 
10 Note that transactions in cryptocurrencies are subject to such restrictions as the lack of reversibility, i.e. an erroneous 
transaction cannot be cancelled as soon as it is written in the block. More traditional payment systems, such as bank 
transfers and credit card payments, are more flexible in this respect. 
of the network does not justify the value of the new cryptocurrency unit for other members of the network 
(see also Dwyer, 2015, who argues the cost of mining is sunk and as such should be disregarded in the market 
value analysis). Others claim their market value is driven by the speculative bubble; yet, strictly speaking, the 
bubble is manifested in upward price deviations from the fundamental value (see, e.g., Siegel, 2003, for a 
review of definitions), hence the bubble explanation is only partial and raises further questions about what 
drives investors’ beliefs that feeds their demand and thus support the bubble.  
If it is the ease and the speed of transactions, then new transaction technologies and fund transfer systems 
that greatly improved in the recent decade (such as Transferwise and similar systems) should have wiped out 
a big chunk of the cryptocurrency value, yet this does not seem to be the case. A possible answer may lie in 
the features that distinguish cryptocurrencies from other assets and payment systems. Privacy, or rather 
anonymity, is a prominent distinctive feature popping up in most discussions of cryptocurrencies. The value 
of a cryptocurrency is then effectively a measure of how much users value anonymity of their transactions. 
While anonymity may be attractive for illegal activities (and some research reviewed below suggests 
cryptocurrencies are often used for these purposes), one cannot rule out users may simply wish more privacy, 
trying to avoid the “Big Brother” effect of traditional transactions. Of course, there may be other factors, for 
example, fashion (users want to use the technology others are talking about), hi-tech appeal (the desire to 
use the most modern technology) or curiosity (the desire to try something new), among others, but these 
phenomena appear shorter-lived than the allure of anonymity. 
A key development in the rise of cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets has been the emergence of 
cryptoexchanges where anyone can open accounts and trade cryptoassets both against each other and 
against fiat currencies. In a survey by Hileman and Rauchs (2017), the US dollar, the Euro and the British 
Pound are currently most widely traded against cryptocurrencies, while the importance of the Chinese 
Renminbi (CNY) significantly diminished after the tightening of the regulation by the People's Bank of China; 
about three-quarters of large exchanges provide trading support for two or more cryptocurrencies. Above, 
we highlighted that cryptoexchanges provide extensive cryptocurrency pricing and trading information in the 
public domain. The emergence of these exchanges has created an entire ‘ecosystem’ of services and 
participants, seeking to provide liquidity, exploit price discrepancies for profit and to support investment by 
both retail and professional investors.  
Academic interest in cryptocurrencies started to soar in 2014 (see Figure 1): the Scopus database lists 127 
publications containing the word ‘Bitcoin’ in the title or abstract or keywords and 24 containing 
‘cryptocurrency’ or ‘cryptocurrencies’ in 2014. In 2017 and especially in 2018 the number of publications 
grew fast, and in 2019 the trend is continuing. Interestingly, academic work focuses much more on the Bitcoin 
than on the more general topic of cryptocurrencies, although in 2018 and in 2019 the gap narrowed. It 
appears that – apart from the Bitcoin frenzy – there is a growing attention to the general phenomenon of 
cryptocurrencies. However, focusing only on the ‘Economics, Econometrics & Finance’ and ‘Business, 
Management & Accounting’ sections of Scopus reveals that the interest in the topic surged a few years later11, 
although the number of publications is still rather low: in 2018 there were just over 100 titles on the topic in 
the above fields. The remaining contributions come from the ‘Computer Science’, ‘Engineering’ and 
‘Mathematics’ disciplines. 
                                                          
11 This delay may also reflect slower publication process in our field, with most papers going through a few not so fast 
rounds of revisions (let alone rejections) before they get published. Huisman and Smits (2017) review recent evidence 
on the duration of the publication process; their sample shows, for example, that tit takes twice as long to publish in 
Economics than, e.g. in Medicine, with an average first response time in Economics and Finance being 16-18 weeks 
(comparable to Azar’s, 2007, estimate of 3-6 months). Their sample does not account for the number of previous 
rejections though. John Cochrane witnesses most of his publications were rejected 2-3 times before getting eventually 
published (https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2017/09/a-paper-and-publishing.html); further anecdotal evidences 
are in Shepherd (1995). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This special issue of the Journal of Industrial & Business Economics offers a multifaceted view on the 
cryptocurrency phenomenon. Contributions have been selected with the objective to extend the existing 
knowledge about cryptocurrencies, which themselves embody innovations and technological change, and 
may appear to be a lucrative form of fund raising for small businesses; extra emphasis is made on areas of 
the journal’s particular interest, such as environment, sustainability and social responsibility. The remainder 
of this editorial proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the contributions that shed light on the 
relationship between cryptocurrencies and financial investments. In Section 3 we focus on behavioral issues, 
while in Section 4 we introduce the development of the socio-economic perspectives related to 
cryptocurrencies and discuss initial coin offerings as a potential source of funds for small businesses. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes discussing the research agenda for the future. 
 
2 Cryptocurrencies and neoclassical finance 
Cryptocurrencies can be used both as a means of payment and as a financial asset. Glaser et al. (2014) provide 
evidence that, at least for the Bitcoin, the main reason to purchase a cryptocurrency is speculative 
investment.  Financial securities, such as ETNs (exchange traded notes) and CFDs (derivative products) that 
replicate Bitcoin’s price performance are made available by brokers, expanding the speculative investment 
opportunities to an even larger set of investors. With this in mind, it makes sense to evaluate 
cryptocurrencies as financial assets. 
The cross-section of cryptocurrency returns has been analyzed in a number of papers. Urquhart (2016) shows 
that Bitcoin returns do not follow random walk, based on which he concludes the Bitcoin market exhibits a 
significant degree of inefficiency, especially in the early years of existence. Corbet et al. (2018) analyze, in the 
time and frequency domains, the relationship between the return of three different cryptocurrencies and a 
variety of other financial assets, showing lack of relationship between crypto- and other assets. Liu and 
Tsyvinski (2018) investigate whether cryptocurrency pricing bears similarity to stocks: none of the risk factors 
explaining movements in stock prices applies to cryptocurrencies in their sample. Moreover, movements in 
exchange rates, commodity prices, or macroeconomic factors of traditional significance for other assets play 
little to none role for most cryptocurrencies. The latter invalidates the view on cryptocurrencies as 
substitutes to monies, or as a store of value (like gold), and rather stresses they are assets of their own class. 
The review of the literature in Corbet et al. (2019) summarizes the most interesting findings on the role of 
cryptocurrencies as a credible investment asset class and as a valuable and legitimate payment system.  
The relative isolation of cryptocurrencies from more traditional financial assets suggests cryptocurrencies 
may offer diversification benefits for investors with short investment horizons. Bouri et al. (2017) as well as 
Baur et al. (2018) find that Bitcoin is suitable for diversification purposes as its returns are uncorrelated with 
those of most major assets. Interestingly, they provide empirical evidence of the predominant usage of 
Bitcoins as speculative assets, though this is done on the data on USD transactions only and thus likely reflects 
the behavior of U.S. cryptocurrency investors mainly. Relatedly, Adhami and Guegan (2020) find that similarly 
to cryptocurrencies, cryptotokens are also a useful diversification device though not a hedge. 
One way to understand similarities and differences between cryptocurrencies and more traditional financial 
assets is to estimate relationships known for traditional assets. A pattern that has received a lot of attention 
in the finance literature is the co-movement of the trading volume and returns/volatility of financial assets 
(a by far non-exhaustive list of examples would include Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988, Foster and Viswanathan, 
1993, and Andersen, 1996 – for equity markets; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993 – for futures; notably, no 
clear evidence of such a relationship exists for currencies, i.e. for exchange rates, see, e.g. Côté, 1994). This 
special issue includes a contribution by Figà-Talamanca and Patacca (2020), who, inter alia, investigate this 
relationship for cryptocurrencies, along with the impact of “relevant events”, which are key disruptive 
changes to the market infrastructure. They find that Bitcoin trading volume does not affect its returns but 
detect a positive effect of Bitcoin trading volumes on return volatility. While their focus is mainly on market 
attention, these results highlight similar forces rule cryptocurrency markets and those for more traditional 
financial assets, again supporting the view of cryptocurrencies as investment assets.12  
The risk of holding cryptocurrencies is discussed in this special issue by Fantazzini and Zimin (2020). 
Cryptocurrency prices may drop dramatically because of a revealed scam or suspected hack, or other hidden 
problems. For example, on June 26th, 2019, the Bitcoin price lost more than 10% of the value in a few minutes 
because of the crashes and outages of the Coinbase digital exchange. As a consequence, a cryptocoin may 
become illiquid and its value may substantially decline. Fantazzini and Zimin (2020) propose a set of models 
to estimate the risk of default of cryptocurrencies, which is back-tested on 42 digital coins. The authors make 
an important point in extending the traditional risk analysis to cryptocurrencies and making an attempt to 
distinguish between market risk and credit risk for them. The former, as typical in the finance literature, is 
associated with movements in prices of other assets. The latter is associated in traditional finance with the 
failure of the counterparty to repay, but as cryptocurrencies presume no repayments, defining credit risk for 
them is tricky. The authors’ approach is to see the “credit” risk of cryptocurrency in the possibility of them 
losing credibility among users, and thus becoming value-less, or “dead”. The authors find, notably, that the 
market risk of cryptocurrencies is driven by Bitcoin, suggesting some degree of homogeneity in the 
cryptomarket. As for the credit risk, the traditional credit scoring models based on the previous month 
trading volume, the one-year trading volume and the average yearly Google search volume work remarkably 
well, suggesting indeed a similarity between the newly defined credit risk for cryptocurrencies and the one 
traditionally used for other asset classes. 
 
3 Cryptocurrencies and behavioral finance and economics 
A large strand of the literature explains market phenomena that work against the neo-classical predictions, 
from the perspective of unquantifiable risk, or ambiguity. Most commonly, ambiguity is associated with the 
impossibility to assign probability values to events that may or may not occur. In the case of cryptocurrencies, 
this type of uncertainty may arise for two reasons: (1) the technology is rather complicated and opaque to 
unsophisticated traders, and (2) the fundamental value of cryptocurrencies is unclear. As we highlighted 
above, even if it is strictly positive, it is likely to derive from intangible factors and as such is rather uncertain. 
Dow and Werlang (1992) demonstrate that under pessimism (ambiguity aversion) uncertainty about 
fundamentals leads to zero trading in financial markets, yet this does not seem to apply to cryptocurrencies. 
In Vinogradov (2012) not only does the no-trade outcome depend on the degrees of optimism and 
pessimism, which may vary, but it also manifests only under high risk (in the standard sense). Still, again, 
although cryptocurrency returns exhibit high volatility, trade volumes are significant. In Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2008) uncertainty leads to “flights to quality” in traditional asset markets, which, if properly 
applied to cryptocurrencies, might also explain the crashes we recently observed.  
Obtaining information is crucial to reduce uncertainty. Figà-Talamanca and Patacca (2020) focus on a rather 
general definition of the demand for information, as manifested in the google search index. According to 
them, the intensity of the internet search for cryptocurrency-related keywords significantly affects 
                                                          
12 “Similar forces” here does not mean similar factors: like Liu and Tsyvinski (2018), Figà-Talamanca and Patacca (2020) 
find a strong dependence of cryptocurrency returns of their past values, which distinguishes them from other asset 
classes. 
cryptocurrency volatility (but not return); this impact vanishes once one controls for “relevant events”. These 
relevant events are effectively announcements of either restrictions (and even bans) on cryptocurrency 
usage, or of the widening of the cryptocurrency market. While we remain largely agnostic regarding what 
people find when they search for cryptocurrency related terms on the Internet, the events give us an 
indication of the type of information that actually matters for cryptocurrency investment decisions, and 
hence for pricing. In uncertainty, when finding relevant information is uneasy, investors might resort to 
watching and mimicking other, presumably better informed, investors’ decisions, resulting in herding 
(Trueman, 1994; Devenow and Welch, 1996), addressed in this special issue by Haryanto et al. (2020), see 
below. 
Uncertainty and attitudes to it are not the only reasons why neoclassical predictions may fail. Shiller (2003) 
highlights that market participants are humans and can make irrational systematic errors contrary to the 
assumption of rationality. Such errors affect prices and returns of assets, creating market inefficiencies. 
Studies in behavioral economics highlight inefficiencies, such as under- or over-reactions to information, as 
causes of market trends and, in extreme cases, of bubbles and crashes. Such reactions have been attributed 
to limited investor attention, overconfidence, mimicry and noise trading, explanations of many of which find 
roots in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, which postulates that decision makers evaluate 
outcomes from the perspective of their current endowment (and are predominantly loss-averse) and “revise” 
probabilities of outcomes when making decisions (predominantly overweighting probabilities of bad 
outcomes and underweighting those of good ones). The loss-aversion led Shefrin and Statman (1985) to 
formulate the ‘disposition effect’ in investment decisions: investors in traditional assets tend to keep assets 
that lose value too long and sell those that gain in value too early.   
Three features distinguish cryptocurrency markets: investors are non-institutional, risk (volatility of returns) 
is high, and the fundamental value is unclear. Under these conditions behavioral biases should be even more 
pronounced than in traditional asset markets. In this special issue Haryanto et al. (2020) study the disposition 
effect and the herding behavior in the cryptocurrency realm by investigating the trading behavior at a 
cryptoexchange: they find a reverse disposition effect in bullish periods where the Bitcoin price increases 
while a positive disposition effect is observed in bearish periods. They also find that in different market 
conditions herding moves along with market trend (in the bullish market a positive market return increases 
herding, while in the bearish market a negative market return has the same effect). The reverse disposition 
effect in the bullish market indicates investors exhibit more optimism and expect returns to further grow, 
which is consistent with the exponential price growth in a bubble in the absence of a clearly defined 
fundamental value. This lack of clarity regarding the fundamental value is also supported by the asymmetric 
herding behavior: when the price grows in a bullish market, investors look at other market participants to 
see whether others also think the price will continue to grow (similarly but with the opposite sign for the 
bearish market).  
This special issue also contributes to the debate on the existence of a ‘bubble’ in the cryptocurrency market 
(see Baek and Elbeck, 2015; Cheah and Fry, 2015). The contribution by Moosa (2020) highlights that the 
Bitcoin was in a bubble up to the end of 2017. The analysis claims that the volume of trading in Bitcoin can 
be explained predominantly in terms of price dynamics considering past price movements, particularly 
positive price changes, and that the path of the price is well described by an explosive process.  
 
4 Socio-economic perspectives 
Critiques emphasize cryptocurrencies are not exempt from frauds and scandals. For example, several millions 
in Bitcoin from the Japanese platform Mt. Gox in 2014 and $50 million in Ether during the Decentralized 
Autonomous Organization (DAO) attack in 2016 were stolen. Moreover, cryptocurrency payments, being 
largely unregulated, do not restrict any purchases, including those illegal.  Böhme et al. (2015) provide 
summary data showing that, at least in the beginning of the Bitcoin era, most transactions were used for drug 
purchases. Foley et al. (2019) estimate that about 46% of Bitcoin transactions are associated with illicit 
activities, but that the illegal share of Bitcoin activity declined over time with the emergence of more opaque 
cryptocurrencies. On top of that, users appear unprotected as payments are often irreversible, and an 
erroneous transfer cannot be reverted, unlike credit card payments (Böhme et al., 2015). 
On the positive side, the development of the cryptocurrency market contributes to the dynamics of access 
to finance (Adhami et al., 2018). The advent of the blockchain technology allowed entrepreneurial teams to 
raise capital in cryptocurrencies and fiat money (which has to be exchanged into a cryptocurrency) through 
the issuance of digital tokens (Initial Coin Offerings, ICOs) and the development of ‘smart contracts’ (Giudici 
and Adhami, 2019). Tokens give their buyers a right to use certain services or products of the issuer, or to 
share profits, in which case they resemble equity. Special cryptoexchanges then serve the secondary market 
for tokens. The OECD (2019) lays out basic principles and typical steps of an ICO. An important distinction 
between tokens and cryptocurrencies is though that there is a liability or some sort of commitment behind 
the token, and this liability determines its value. Now that this cryptoasset bears more similarity with 
traditional assets, one would expect also the main predictions of neoclassical finance to come true. In fact, 
in a recent empirical study of cryptotokens, Howell et al. (2018) demonstrate the effects of asymmetric 
information on tokens trading: their liquidity and trading volume are positively associated with the 
information inflow. The latter is achieved through voluntary disclosure of information (including the 
operating budget and their business plans), and quality signaling (e.g. information on prior venture capital 
funding of the issuer). 
Cryptocurrencies, which underlie the ICO procedure, are claimed to provide much more equitable and 
democratic access to capital as well as greater efficiency, compared to fiat money, allowing peer-to-peer 
transactions and avoiding the intermediation of banks (Nakamoto, 2008; Karlstrøm, 2014). This is normally 
done via an ICO, and could be a relevant opportunity for small business, which often experience a gap in 
funding and miss competences to relate with professional investors (Giudici and Paleari, 2000). OECD (2019) 
also reports ICOs are a potential route for low cost finance for SMEs. 
Will cryptocurrencies favor a process of “democratization” of funding? This has been widely discussed by 
practitioners and investors, with a great variety of views. For example, The World Economic Forum White 
Paper (WEF, 2018), claims that cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies could increase the worldwide 
trading volume, moving to better levels of service and lower transaction fees. To this extent, the contribution 
by Ricci (2020) in this special issue considers the geographical network of Bitcoin transactions in order to 
discover potential relationships between Bitcoin exchanging among countries and national levels of 
economic freedom. The study shows that high levels of freedom to trade internationally, that guarantee low 
tariffs and facilitates international trade, are strongly connected to the Bitcoin diffusion. On the one hand, 
the freedom to trade internationally could increase the foreign trade through the use of alternative payment 
instruments capable of reducing transaction costs (like cryptocurrencies), on the other, low capital controls 
could encourage the use of cryptocurrencies for illegal conduct, such as money laundering.  
The reward system for cryptocurrency ‘miners’ creates an incentive to leverage on computing power, 
increasing the consumption of energy. For example, Böhme et al. (2015) note that computational efforts of 
miners are costly, mainly because the proof-of-work calculations are “power-intensive, consuming more than 
173 megawatts of electricity continuously. For perspective, that amount is … approximately $178 million per 
year at average US residential electricity prices.” The sustainability topic is raised in this special issue by Vaz 
and Brown (2020). They posit that there are significant sustainability issues in the cryptocurrency 
development exceeding potential benefits, that are captured typically by a few people. Therefore, they call 
for different institutional models with government and public engagement, as to avoid that the market is 
driven mostly by private money and profit motivations. 
 
5 Conclusions    
Growing attention has been paid to cryptocurrencies in the academic literature, discussing whether they are 
supposed to disrupt the economy or are a speculative bubble which could crash and burn or favor money 
laundering and criminals. In support of the first view, it is often argued they meet a market need for a faster 
and more secure payment and transaction system, disintermediating monopolies, banks and credit cards. 
Critics, on the other hand, point out that the unstable value of cryptocurrencies make them more a purely 
speculative asset than a new type of money.   
The reality is somewhere in between these two positions, with cryptocurrencies performing some useful 
functions and hence adding economic value, and yet being potentially highly unstable. The trend is towards 
a regulation of cryptocurrencies, and more generally of all crypto-assets, and to their increased trading on 
organized and regulated exchanges. This would go against the original libertarian rationale that originated 
the Bitcoin but is a necessary step to provide protection for market participants and reduce moral hazard 
and information asymmetries. 
How will future research build on the articles in this special issue and on other recent studies of 
cryptocurrencies? It is of course always difficult to anticipate substantial future research contributions, 
especially in relation to such a recent and novel phenomenon like cryptocurrencies. But we would argue that 
there are a few major issues that deserve continued attention from scholars in finance, economics and 
related disciplines. 
One is the need for a much closer examination of the ‘market microstructure’ of cryptoexchanges. Some 
recent research already draws attention to the functioning of cryptoexchanges. For example, Gandal et al. 
(2018) investigate price manipulations at the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange; a notable by-product of their 
research is the finding that suspicious trading on one exchange led to equal price changes on other 
exchanges, suggesting traders can effectively engage in arbitrage activities across exchanges. Similarly, signs 
of efficiency are detected in Akyildirim et al. (2019) who investigate pricing of Bitcoin futures on traditional 
exchanges – Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
Importantly, in their study information flows and price discovery go from futures to spot markets, in contrast 
to previous results for traditional assets; a likely explanation is the difference in the type of traders at 
cryptoexchanges (that determine the spot price) and both CME and CBOE.13  Yet more has to be learnt about 
cryptoexchanges. Their open nature distinguishes them from conventional stock exchanges and dealer 
markets with transactors directly accessing the market rather than relying on brokers as intermediaries. Is 
this open nature helpful, providing greater liquidity and narrowing trading spreads? Or does it disadvantage 
some investors, limiting regulatory oversight and allowing a core of participants to manipulate market prices 
at the expense of other investors? Do the technical arrangements supporting cryptoexchanges, notably the 
use of distributed ledger or blockchain technology which eliminates the need for post-trade settlement, lead 
to more efficient trading outcomes in terms of price, liquidity and speed of execution? Could these 
technologies also improve the efficiency of outcomes in conventional financial exchange?  
The second issue, widely debated in the cryptocurrency literature, is whether cryptocurrencies have a 
fundamental own value. Dwyer (2015) conjectures the limitation of the quantity produced can create an 
equilibrium in which a digital currency has a positive value: this limitation is a form of commitment, replacing 
the implicit obligation of Central banks to exchange fiat money into gold. Heyes (2017) advocates the cost of 
production view on cryptocurrency pricing; yet, as we discussed earlier, from a market equilibrium 
                                                          
13 Interestingly, CBOE futures present an informational advantage over the CME alternative, possibly because of the 
smaller size of contracts and hence the larger number of investors actively trading. 
perspective, being sunk cost (as in Dwyer, 2015), it does not matter for the pricing of existing coins.14 A 
concurrent work by Bolt and Van Oordt (2019) outlines three key elements of the cryptocurrency value: 
convertibility into fiat money or ability to buy goods and services, investors’ expectations, and factors that 
determine acceptance of the cryptocurrency in the future, by both vendors and buyers. Simultaneously, 
Schilling and Uhlig (2019) offer a model where cryptocurrencies are a reliable medium of exchange and 
compete against fiat money: this role implies the current price of cryptocurrencies is the expectation of their 
future value (a martingale), yet interestingly, competition and substitutability between the two, implies in 
their analysis cryptocurrencies should disappear in the long run equilibrium. The authors admit that their 
analysis abstracts away such distinctive features of cryptocurrencies as “censorship resistance, transparency, 
and speed of trading”.  Above we have provided a simplified argument explaining that cryptocurrencies may 
have a value by offering features, such as anonymity of transactions, not covered by traditional currencies. 
Many findings, also those included in this special issue, point towards the intangible nature of the 
cryptocurrency value. Knowing more about it, we would be better equipped to understand the price 
dynamics and, reciprocally, the price dynamics would improve our understanding of decisions made by 
investors. So far, we remain very much agnostic in this respect. 
The third issue is the societal role of cryptocurrencies and their regulation. While many discussions of 
cryptocurrencies stress that they are free of regulation, and the desire to be unregulated was one of drivers 
behind their creation, there is considerable controversy both about the application of existing regulation to 
cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets and also what if any new regulations may be needed to protect 
investors, prevent financial crime and ensure financial stability. Are crypto investments securities and 
therefore subject to securities law (in the US this has been determined by the so-called Howey test)? What 
about the regulation of cryptoexchanges and the problems of hacking with some prominent examples of 
theft and failure to enforce “know-your-customer” (KYC) and anti-money-laundering (ALM) regulations?  
Globally, regulators are shifting towards a tougher stance. Some exchanges are seeking to engage with 
regulators and be fully compliant. Others prefer to operate outside of regulation. A simple argument is that 
one has to protect investors and users from financial and technological risks they face. However, as papers 
presented in this special issue demonstrate, cryptocurrencies differ from traditional assets, hence the validity 
of traditional arguments, such as systemic stability, consumer protection and promotion of competition, is 
not clear. As our literature review and papers in this special issue underscore, cryptocurrencies do not 
comove with other assets; they help diversification and do not pose an immediate danger for systemic 
stability. There appears to be a significant and growing degree of competition between different 
cryptocurrencies and cryptoexchanges, and yet we have to understand whether and why such a competition 
is desirable for the society.  
Similarly, we need to understand whether there is a need to protect consumers. In traditional asset markets 
and in banking such protection improves allocation of resources and promotes economic growth and welfare, 
which is not straightforwardly applicable to cryptocurrencies and existing other cryptoassets. An extra 
dimension that arises from the studies in our special issue is the sustainability and environmental impact of 
cryptocurrencies, and this is again different from other asset classes. 
Last but not the least, yet another major issue is how cryptocurrency technologies may affect conventional 
fiat currency issued by central banks.15 Emerging literature on the competition between cryptocurrencies 
and fiat money raises concerns that the emergence of privately issued cryptocurrencies could weaken the 
                                                          
14 It may matter though for the decision to mine new coins (the marginal cost of coin production should be below market 
price, which stands for the marginal profit). Hayes (2017) also points at the difficulty of the mining algorithm as a driver 
of cryptocurrency prices. This measure may be an indicator of the reliability of the cryptographic technology behind the 
cryptocurrency, and thus part of the fundamental value, as it represents security of transactions, valued by the users. 
15 Pieters (2020, forthcoming) provides a useful wider review of central banks and digital payments technologies. 
monetary policy tools employed by the central bank and result in welfare losses (Zhu and Hendry, 2018; 
Schilling and Uhlig, 2019). Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2019) find that when private currency 
competes with a central bank issued e-money the former should vanish in equilibrium, yet It remains unclear 
what happens if cryptocurrencies are not a perfect substitute to fiat money.16  Cukiermann (2019), building 
on the analysis by Roubini (2018), brings the discussion to a further level by discussing the potential also for 
cryptocurrency issue by the central bank being used to implement fully reserved or narrow banking and thus 
to promote financial stability.  
We hope this special issue contributes to our understanding of cryptocurrencies and surrounding issues. We 
also reckon it helps generate knowledge and materials useful for practitioners and scholars, involved in 
studying and shaping the cryptocurrency market for the future. Very possibly this will evolve and become 
very different from what we observe today, but for sure already now cryptocurrencies embody an innovation 
capable of moving our financial markets and economies forward in terms of efficiency and growth. We just 
need to learn using this innovation properly. 
 
Compliance with ethical standards 




Adhami, S., Giudici, G., & Martinazzi, S. (2018). Why do businesses go crypto? An empirical analysis of initial 
coin offerings. Journal of Economics & Business, 100, 64-75. 
Adhami, S. & Guegan, D. (2020). Crypto assets: the role of ICO tokens within a well-diversified portfolio. 
Journal of Industrial & Business Economics, forthcoming. 
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (1988). A theory of intraday patterns: Volume and price variability. The Review 
of Financial Studies, 1(1), 3-40. 
Akyildirim, E., Corbet, S., Katsiampa, P., Kellard, N., & Sensoy, A. (2019). The development of Bitcoin futures: 
Exploring the interactions between cryptocurrency derivatives. Finance Research Letters, in press. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.07.007 
Andersen, T. G. (1996). Return volatility and trading volume: An information flow interpretation of stochastic 
volatility. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 169-204. 
Azar, O.H. (2007) The slowdown in first-response times of economics journals: Can it be beneficial? Economic 
inquiry, 45(1), 179-187 
Baek, C., & Elbeck, M. (2015). Bitcoins as an investment or speculative vehicle? A first look. Applied Economics 
Letters, 22(1), 30–34. 
Baliga, Arati. (2017). Understanding Blockchain Consensus Models. Persistent White paper, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/da8a/37b10bc1521a4d3de925d7ebc44bb606d740.pdf  
                                                          
16 Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2019) also advance an interesting idea that cryptocurrencies, being “private 
money”, create limits for monetary policy and, at the same time, provides market discipline for the government. 
Bank of England, Financial Conduct Authority, and HM Treasury. (2018). Cryptoassets Taskforce: Final Report. 
London.  
Baur, D. G., Hong, K., & Lee, A. D. (2018). Bitcoin: Medium of exchange or speculative assets?. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 54, 177-189. 
Bessembinder, H., & Seguin, P. J. (1993). Price volatility, trading volume, and market depth: Evidence from 
futures markets. Journal of financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(1), 21-39. 
Blandin, A., Cloots, A.S., Hussain, H., Rauchs, M., Saleuddin, R., Allen, J.G., Cloud, K. & Zhang, B.Z. (2019). 
Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study. Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. 
Böhme, R., Christin, N., Edelman, B., & Moore, T. (2015). Bitcoin: Economics, technology, and governance. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(2), 213–238. 
Bolt, W., & Van Oordt, M. R. (2019). On the value of virtual currencies. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
in press. 
Bouri, E., Molnár, P., Azzi, G., Roubaud, D., & Hagfors, L. (2017). On the hedge and safe haven properties of 
Bitcoin: Is it really more than a diversifier? Finance Research Letters, 20, 192-198. 
Caballero, R. J., & Krishnamurthy, A. (2008). Collective risk management in a flight to quality episode. The 
Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2195-2230.  
Cheah, E.-T., & Fry, J. (2015). Speculative bubbles in bitcoin markets? An empirical investigation into the 
fundamental value of bitcoin. Economics Letters, 130, 32–36. 
Corbet, S., Meegan, A., Larkin, C., Lucey, B., & Yarovaya, L. (2018). Exploring the dynamic relationships 
between cryptocurrencies and other financial assets. Economics Letters, 156, 28-34. 
Corbet, S., Lucey, B., Urquhart, A., & Yarovaya, L. (2019). Cryptocurrencies as a financial asset: A systematic 
analysis. International Review of Financial Analysis, 62, 182-199. 
Côté, A. (1994). Exchange rate volatility and trade. Bank of Canada. 
Cukierman, A. (2019) Welfare and political economy aspects of a central bank digital currency. Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper DP13728, May 2019. 
Devenow, A., & Welch, I. (1996). Rational herding in financial economics. European Economic Review, 40 (3-
5), 603-615. 
Dow, J., & da Costa Werlang, S. R. (1992). Uncertainty aversion, risk aversion, and the optimal choice of 
portfolio. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 197-204. 
Dwyer, G. P. (2015). The economics of bitcoin and similar private digital currencies. Journal of Financial 
Stability, 17, 81–91. 
EBA. (2019). Report with Advice for the European Commission on Crypto-Assets. 
https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2545547/EBA+Report+on+crypto+assets.pdf. 
ESMA. (2019). “Advice: Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-
Assets.https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-1391_crypto_advice.pdf. 
Fantazzini, D., & Zimin, S. (2020). A multivariate approach for the joint modelling of market risk and credit 
risk for cryptocurrencies. Journal of Industrial & Business Economics, this issue. 
FCA (2019) Guidance on Cryptoassets Feedback and Final Guidance to CP 19/3. Policy Statement PS19/22. 
Financial Conduct Authority July 2019 
Fernández-Villaverde, J. and Sanches, D. (2019) Can currency competition work? Journal of Monetary 
Economics, in press, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.07.003  
Figà-Talamanca, G. & Patacca M. (2020). Disentangling the relationship between Bitcoin and market 
attention measures. Journal of Industrial & Business Economics, this issue. 
Foley, S., J. Karlsen, & Putnins, T. (2019). Sex, drugs, and bitcoin: How much illegal activity is financed through 
cryptocurrencies? Review of Financial Studies, 32 (5), 1798–853. 
Foster, F. D., & Viswanathan, S. (1993). Variations in trading volume, return volatility, and trading costs: 
Evidence on recent price formation models. The Journal of Finance, 48(1), 187-211. 
FSB (2018). Crypto-asset markets Potential channels for future financial stability implications. Basel: Financial 
Stability Board, 10. 
Gandal, N., Hamrick, J. T., Moore, T., & Oberman, T. (2018). Price manipulation in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem. Journal of Monetary Economics, 95, 86-96. 
Giudici, G., & Adhami, S. (2019). The governance of ICO projects: Assessing the impact on fundraising success. 
Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, 46(2), 283-312. 
Giudici, G., & Paleari, S. (2000). The provision of finance to innovation: A survey conducted among Italian 
technology-based small firms. Small Business Economics, 14 (1), 37–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008187416389 
Glaser, F., Zimmermann, K., Haferkorn, M., Weber, M. C., & Siering, M. (2014). Bitcoin-asset or currency? 
revealing users' hidden intentions. Revealing Users' Hidden Intentions (April 15, 2014). ECIS. 
Goldstein, I., Wei Jiang, W., & Karolyi, G.A. (2019). To FinTech and Beyond. The Review of Financial Studies, 
32 (5), 1647–1661 https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz025  
Hacker, P. & Thomale, S. (2017). Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under 
EU Financial Law  European Company and Financial Law Review, 15 (4), 645-696. 
Haryanto, S., Subroto A. & Ulpah M. (2020). Disposition Effect and Herding Behavior in the Cryptocurrency 
Market. Journal of Industrial & Business Economics, this issue. 
Hileman, G., & Rauchs, M. (2017). Global cryptocurrency benchmarking study. Cambridge Centre for 
Alternative Finance, 33. 
Howell, S. T., Niessner, M., & Yermack, D. (2018). Initial coin offerings: Financing growth with cryptocurrency 
token sales (No. w24774). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Huisman, J., & Smits, J. (2017). Duration and quality of the peer review process: the author’s 
perspective. Scientometrics, 113(1), 633-650. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292. 
Karlstrøm, H. (2014). Do libertarians dream of electric coins? The material embeddedness of bitcoin. 
Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 15(1), 25–36. 
Liu, Y., & Tsyvinski, A. (2018). Risks and returns of cryptocurrency (No. w24877). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Milne, A. (2015). Central Securities Depositories and Securities Clearing and Settlement: Business Practice 
and Public Policy Concern. In Analyzing the Economics of Financial Market Infrastructures Edited by Martin 
Diehl, Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Richard Heuver, and Serafín Martínez-Jaramillo. IGI Global. 
Milne, Alistair K. L., Argument by False Analogy: The Mistaken Classification of Bitcoin as Token Money 
(November 25, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290325  
 
Moosa, I. (2020). The Bitcoin: A Sparkling Bubble or Price Discovery? Journal of Industrial & Business 
Economics, this issue. 
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. 
Narayanan, A., Bonneau, B., Felten, E. Miller, A. & Goldfeder, S. (2016). Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency 
Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction. Princeton University Press. 
OECD (2019), Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) for SME Financing, www.oecd.org/finance/initial-coin-offerings-for-
sme-financing.htm  
Pieters, G. (2020, forthcoming), Central Banks and Digital Currencies, chapter in Raghavendra Rau, Robert 
Wardrop and Luigi Zingales (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Alternative Finance. Palgrave MacMillan. 
Pilkington, M. (2016). Blockchain technology: Principles and applications. In F. Xavier Olleros, & Majlinda 
Zhegu (Eds.). Research handbooks on digital transformations (pp. 225–253). Edward Elgar. 
Popper, N., 2015. Digital Gold, Harper Collins. 
Raiborn, C., & Sivitanides, M. (2015). Accounting issues related to Bitcoins. Journal of Corporate Accounting 
& Finance, 26(2), 25-34. 
Ricci, P. (2020). How economic freedom reflects on the Bitcoin transaction network. Journal of Industrial & 
Business Economics, this issue. 
Richter, C., Kraus, S., & Bouncken, R.C. (2015). Virtual currencies like Bitcoin as a paradigm shift in the field 
of transactions. International Business & Economics Research Journal, 14(4), 575-586. 
Roubini N. (2018), Exploring the cryptocurrency and blockchain ecosystem, Testimony for the Hearing of the 
US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Community Affairs, October 11. 
Schilling, L., & Uhlig, H. (2019). Some simple bitcoin economics. Journal of Monetary Economics (forthcoming) 
Shiller, R. J. (2003). From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(1), 83-104. 
Shefrin, H., & Statman, M. (1985). The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory 
and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 777-790. 
Shepherd, G. B. (1995). Rejected: Leading economists ponder the publication process. T. Horton and 
Doughters. 
Siegel, J. J. (2003). What is an asset price bubble? An operational definition. European financial 
management, 9(1), 11-24. 
Tschorsch, F., & Scheuermann, B. (2016). Bitcoin and beyond: A technical survey on decentralized digital 
currencies. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 18(3),2084–2123. 
Trueman, B. (1994). Analyst forecasts and herding behavior. The Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), 97-124. 
Urquhart, A., (2016). The inefficiency of Bitcoin. Economics Letters, 148 (1), 80-82. 
Vaz, J. & Brown, K. (2020). Sustainable Development and Cryptocurrencies as Private Money. Journal of 
Industrial & Business Economics, this issue. 
Vinogradov, D. (2012). Destructive effects of constructive ambiguity in risky times. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 31(6), 1459-1481. 
WEF (2018). Trade Tech – A New Age for Trade and Supply Chain Finance, The World Economic Forum In 
collaboration with Bain & Company. World Economic Forum, January 2018. Available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Trade_Tech_report_2018.pdf 
Zhu, Yu and Hendry, Scott, A Framework for Analyzing Monetary Policy in an Economy with E-Money 




Figure 1. Publications listed on the Scopus database containing ‘Cryptocurrency/ies’ and ‘Bitcoin’ in the 
title or abstract or keywords. 
The graph reports the number of publications tracked by the Scopus database (www.scopus.com) accessed on August 
10, 2019 containing the words “Cryptocurrency/ies” or “Bitcoin” in the title or abstract or keywords. The subsample 
ECON refers to the category Economics, Econometrics & Finance while the subsample BUS refers to Business, 















2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (YTD)
Cryptocurrency/ies (All) Cryptocurrency/ies (ECON) Cryptocurrency/ies (BUS)
Bitcoin (All) Bitcoin (ECON) Bitcoin (BUS)
Table 1. List of cryptocurrencies with market capitalization above $1bn as of 26 August 2019 (Source: 
www.coinmarketcap.com) 
 
# Name Market Cap Price Volume (24h) Circulating Supply 
1 Bitcoin $184,544,558,521 $10,311.2
1 
$17,873,581,752 17,897,462 BTC 
2 Ethereum $20,516,368,996 $190.89 $6,874,655,939 107,475,882 ETH 
3 XRP $11,653,569,398 $0.271585 $1,128,653,524 42,909,539,227 XRP
  
4 Bitcoin Cash  $5,591,057,154 $311.17 $1,340,301,589 17,967,738 BCH 
5 Litecoin  $4,689,355,041 $74.30 $2,781,009,887 63,114,962 LTC 
6 Binance Coin  $4,087,419,033 $26.28 $175,001,868 155,536,713 BNB 
7 Tether  $4,057,931,416 $1.00 $19,899,745,246 4,049,107,372 USD
T 
8 EOS  $3,368,394,232 $3.63 $1,597,861,289 929,024,131 EOS 
9 Bitcoin SV  $2,398,713,217 $134.34 $295,102,323 17,854,986 BSV 
10 Monero  $1,402,906,280 $81.68 $111,521,420 17,174,622 XMR 
11 Stellar  $1,326,874,823 $0.067573 $122,814,593 19,636,142,641 XL
M 
12 Cardano  $1,285,561,035 $0.049584 $105,303,516 25,927,070,538 AD
A 
13 UNUS SED LEO  $1,199,562,655 $1.20 $6,782,406 999,498,893 LEO 
14 TRON $1,181,766,594 $0.017722 $508,503,418 66,682,072,191 TRX 
 
Notes: Market Cap is the total value of cryptocurrency in circulation at the market price (Price) of the 
reporting day. Volume is the total volume of transaction in the cryptocurrency in the last 24 hours. 
Circulating Supply is the nominal amount of cryptocurrency in circulation.  
 
